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Abstract:  This paper replicates and analyses a study by Hoover and Pecorino on Federal 
spending in US states (Hoover and Pecorino, 2005; henceforth H&P). H&P followed on path-
breaking research by Atlas et al. (1995) in which evidence was claimed in favour of the 
“small state effect;” namely, that since every state is represented by two Senators, small states 
have a disproportionate influence relative to their population size. H&P extended previous 
research by hypothesizing that if a small state effect existed, it should be most evident in 
Federal spending for (i) grants and (ii) procurement compared to other categories of Federal 
spending. They test this hypothesis using panel data of Federal spending in US states from 
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WORKING PAPER No. 11/2013 
 
REPLICATION STUDY: 
Hoover and Pecorino (Public Choice, 2005) 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION. 
 
This paper replicates and analyses a study by Hoover and Pecorino on Federal spending in 
US states (Hoover and Pecorino, 2005; henceforth H&P).  H&P followed on path-breaking 
research by Atlas et al. (1995) in which evidence was claimed in favour of the “small state 
effect;” namely, that since every state is represented by two Senators, small states have a 
disproportionate influence relative to their population size.  The problem with testing this 
hypothesis is that there is no variation in the number of Senators across states, so testing 
requires that one look at variation in the ratio of Senators per capita and assume that this 
variable captures the small state effect.   
 Recognizing this limitation of previous research, H&P hypothesized that if a small 
state effect existed, then it should be most evident in Federal spending for (i) grants and (ii) 
procurement compared to other categories of Federal spending.  Their empirical evidence 
was generally supportive, leading them to conclude that political influence from senate repre-
sentation influenced Federal spending across states.    
 The finding is an important one, because it suggests that the allocation of Federal 
funding is significantly affected by constitutionally embedded political constraints rather than 
welfare-improving allocation schemes.  Together, the H&P and Atlas et al. studies have been 
widely influential in the literature.   At the time of this writing, they have been cited 8 and 55 
times in Web of Science, respectively.   
 Our study re-analyses the data underlying H&P.  While we are able to closely 
approximate H&P’s results, we argue that the original specifications suffer from a number of 
shortcomings.  When these are corrected, a somewhat different picture emerges.  We find 
some support for the small state hypothesis with a substantial minority of conflicting results. 
 The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our replication of H&P’s results.  
Section 3 identifies three specification issues with H&P’s original analysis. Section 4 
respecifies the main equations accordingly, and applies the same fixed effects estimation 
employed by H&P. Section 5 then discusses why fixed effects estimation may not be the 
appropriate methodology for identifying the small state effect given the characteristics of the 
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data. We explain why a panel data “between” estimator may be better, and then report the 
associated estimates. Section 6 formalizes H&P’s hypotheses and presents the test results.  
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  REPLICATION OF HOOVER AND PECORINO (1985). 
 
Description of H&P’s main estimating equations. H&P’s main estimating equations consist 
of fixed effects OLS regressions where the dependent variable is state-level, per capita 
Federal spending by budget category.  A total of five Federal spending categories are 
investigated: (i) Retirement, (ii) Other, (iii) Wages, (iv) Grants, and (v) Procurement.  Each 
of these categories is described in detail in Table 1 of H&P.  Together these 5 categories 
include all Federal spending in states other than interest rate payments.   
 As their main measure of the small state effect, H&P use the variable SENATE, de-
fined as 
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State Population
 
 
 
, the number of Senators per capita.  If small states are more ef-
fective in securing Federal spending, then the sign of the coefficient of the SENATE variable 
should be positive. In other words, per capita Federal spending in a state should be inversely 
related to its population. Noting that there are other reasons why state spending could be 
inversely related to population, H&P say that evidence can be deduced by comparing the 
estimated effect of the SENATE variable across the different budget equations (H&P, p. 99): 
A priori, we expect that grants and procurement are the spending categories 
which will be most sensitive to our political variables. Our expectations for 
grants are informed by the previous work of Lee (1998, 2000). Procurement 
spending would seem to be particularly sensitive to political factors, as evid-
enced by numerous anecdotes of intervention by congressional representatives 
to prevent the Pentagon from killing a weapons project produced in his or her 
district. Retirement and disability and other direct payments should be least 
sensitive to our political variables, since they are mainly determined by eligib-
ility factors such as age and income.  We expect wages and salaries to be in-
termediate in the degree to which political variables affect the per capita 
spending figures. Clearly politics plays a major role in the initial decision 
about where to locate Federal projects and administrative offices which will 
generate wage and salary payments to Federal employees. Because many of 
these location decisions have a high degree of permanence, much of the poli-
tical influence may be absorbed by the state fixed effects parameters which are 
included in our analysis. 
 
The statement above predicts the following ordering of sensitivities to Senate representation 
across different categories: 
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 - P1: SENATE, Wages SENATE, Retirement   
 - P2: SENATE, Wages SENATE, Other   
 - P3: SENATE, Grants SENATE, Retirement   
 - P4: SENATE, Grants SENATE, Other   
 - P5: SENATE, Grants SENATE, Wages   
 - P6: SENATE, Procurement SENATE, Retirement   
 - P7: SENATE, Procurement SENATE, Other   
 - P8: SENATE, Procurement SENATE, Wages   
 
While H&P do not directly test these predictions, the predictions do inform H&P’s discussion 
of their empirical results.  In addition, H&P give special consideration to the category of 
procurements (“procurement spending would seem to be particularly sensitive to political 
factors”).  Accordingly, our analysis will focus on assessing the empirical support for these 
eight predictions. 
 To control for state characteristics, H&P include variables for income per capita 
(INCOME), elderly share of the population (ELDERLY), and land area per capita 
(LANDAREA).  Political control variables include the number of electoral votes assigned to a 
state (ELECTORAL), per capita House representation (HOUSE), the state’s share of all repre-
sentatives from the same party as the current U.S. President (HOUSEP), the number of Sena-
tors from the state belonging to the same party as the current President (SENATEP), the 
state’s share of all representatives in the House’s majority party (HMAJOR), the number of 
Senators belonging to the majority party in the Senate (SMAJOR), a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the current President won the state (VOTE), the absolute size of the margin of 
victory for the President in that state (MARGIN), and the interaction of these two variables 
(MARVOTE).  Also included is a dummy variable to indicate whether the governor of the 
state belongs to the same party as the President (GOVP), and dummy variables to indicate if 
the Senate majority leader (MAJLEADER) or Senate minority leader (MINLEADER) is from 
the state.  For their data, H&P use annual Federal expenditures across all 50 states for the 
years 1983-1999.  All explanatory variables were lagged by one year to account for the fact 
that spending decisions made in year t were not implemented until year t+1.   
H&P’s results and our replication.  TABLE 1 reproduces the main results from H&P for 
each of the 5 Federal spending categories, plus the overall level of Federal spending per 
capita (SPENDING).
1
  Immediately to the right of each column are the results from our 
                                                          
1. H&P’s results are taken from their Table 4 (H&P, p. 104). 
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replication.  Our replicated results are very close, albeit not identical, to H&P.  We note that 
we interacted numerous times with one of the authors of the H&P study (Gary Hoover), who 
graciously assisted us in our replication efforts.  While the original data for the H&P study 
are no longer available, Gary Hoover provided us with updated data that allowed us to closely 
match the original results. 
 The key variable in TABLE 1 is SENATE, measured in units of Senators per one 
million population.  H&P deduce evidence for the small state effect by comparing the 
“sensitivity” of Federal spending to this variable across budget categories.  They do this by 
weighting the respective SENATE coefficient estimate by the mean value of per capita 
Federal expenditures in that category.  This calculation is performed in TABLE 2 for both the 
original and replicated results.  H&P interpret these findings thusly (H&P, p. 110): 
“…we find the strongest effect in a spending category, procurement, where we 
expect political factors to play a large role.  The next largest effect of senate 
representation is found in the wages and salaries spending category.  Again, 
this is a category where we would expect politics to play at least a moderately 
important role.  Senate representation also has an effect on grants spending … 
The effects of senate representation on expenditure are much smaller for 
retirement spending and the category OTHER.  For these categories, we would 
not expect, a priori, that senate representation would play an important role for 
spending.” 
 
We note that H&P’s original statement was that they expected GRANTS and 
PROCUREMENT to be most sensitive to the small state effect, RETIREMENT and OTHER to 
be least sensitive, and WAGES to be moderately sensitive.  This is a strong prediction, and the 
empirical results do not exactly line up according to their prediction:  PROCUREMENT and 
WAGES are estimated to be most sensitive to the small state effect, with GRANTS being 
moderately sensitive.  As predicted, RETIREMENT and OTHER are least sensitive.   
 H&P interpret these results as “strong support” for the small state effect (H&P, p. 
110).  Our replication of their regressions confirms their empirical findings. 
 
3.  SPECIFICATION ISSUES. 
 
Specification Problem 1: A near fall into the dummy variable trap.  The first specification 
issue with the coefficients reported in TABLE 1 is that the estimating equations include 
LANDAREA (defined as land area divided by population) and a state fixed effect.  Over this 
sample period no state experienced a change in its land area, so LANDAREA would be per-
fectly collinear with the state fixed effect if population did not vary.  Similarly, the number of 
Senators is fixed for each state, so that the only variation in the SENATE variable arises 
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because SENATE varies inversely with population.  If the specified regression equation had, 
instead, contained lnSENATE and lnLANDAREA, along with state fixed effects, then iden-
tification would have been impossible.  Identification of the SENATE and LANDAREA coef-
ficients thus relies entirely on the model being linear rather than log-linear in these variables.  
This is clearly seen by noting that a regression of lnLANDAREA on lnSENATE and state fixed 
effects produces an R
2
 of 1.  This strongly suggests that the estimates will be highly sensitive 
to reasonable alterations in model specification. 
Specification Problem 2:  Near perfect collinearity of the SENATE variable with the other in-
cluded explanatory variables.  While the linear specification of the model allows independent 
variation of the SENATE variable in the fixed effects specification, in fact the degree of col-
linearity with the other included variables is exceedingly high.  When SENATE is regressed 
on the other explanatory variables in the original specification, the associated R
2
 is 0.9972.  In 
this case, it is not clear what the SENATE variable is actually measuring, as the effective vari-
able is the associated residual with 99.72% of the original variation in SENATE removed.    
Specification Problem 3:  Absolute size versus relative share of state population.  As noted 
above, SENATE is measured by 
2
State Population
 
 
 
, the argument being that citizens of 
states with larger populations have less power per capita in the Senate. This specification 
suggests that if a small state increases in population over time, its “small state effect” will 
diminish even if its population increase is less than that of other states.  This is not at all 
obvious.  We suggest a better specification is a state’s share of total US population. Define 
US Population
SENATE2
State Population
 
  
 
.  According to this specification, if populations in all states 
increase by the same percentage the influence of that state in the U.S. Senate will remain the 
same.  As with H&P’s original specification, a positive coefficient for SENATE2 is consistent 
with the small state effect. 
Additional specification issues.  As noted above, evidence in favour of the small state effect 
is to be found by comparing sensitivities of different spending categories to changes in the 
SENATE (or SENATE2) variable. As calculating elasticities is awkward in a linear specifica-
tion, we use the natural log of the respective spending variable as the dependent variable.  
Then the coefficients on the SENATE2 variable can be directly compared across specifica-
tions, and direct tests of prediction P1-P8 can be carried out.  In a similar fashion, we trans-
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form the income and land area variables using natural logs to facilitate interpretation of their 
coefficients.   
 
4.  ROBUSTNESS CHECK #1: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION OF AN  
     ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION OF THE SMALL STATE EFFECT. 
 
We now check the robustness of H&P’s results by substituting the SENATE2 variable defined 
above for H&P’s SENATE variable.  Table 3A reports the results from estimating the 
alternative specification using fixed effects OLS.  We focus on the coefficient for SENATE2 
and recall that 
US Population
SENATE2
State Population
 
  
 
, so that small states are characterized by 
larger values. To aid in interpreting the estimated coefficient for this variable, note that 
Maine, which is ranked at the 25
th
 percentile in population, has a SENATE2 value that is 
approximately 150 units larger than Massachusetts, which is ranked at the 75
th
 percentile.   
 H&P found PROCUREMENT to be the spending category most sensitive to political 
influence. The estimates in TABLE 3A support this finding.  According to the coefficient 
estimate of 0.0029, Maine would receive approximately 44% (= .0029*150) more Federal, 
per capita procurement expenditures than Massachusetts.  The coefficient is significant at the 
10% level.  The second most sensitive budget category is WAGES.  Using the same 
calculation as above, a relatively small state would receive approximately 29% more in 
Federal spending.  These results are consistent with H&P’s findings. 
 However, not all the results are confirming.  There is no evidence of a small state 
effect for GRANTS.  Even more puzzling is the fact that the estimated coefficient for OTHER 
is negative and significant, indicating that larger states are able to secure more non-retirement 
transfer payments per capita.  This would appear to be a direct contradiction of the small state 
effect.  However, as H&P point out, there could be other reasons why state population may 
affect Federal spending.  For this reason, an appropriate test of the small state effect requires 
a comparison of coefficients across budget categories. 
 TABLE 3B repeats the previous analysis, but drops the other political variables to 
determine the extent to which these may be affecting the SENATE2 estimates.  
PROCUREMENT and GRANTS show evidence of the greatest sensitivity to state size.  The 
coefficient for SENATE2 is still negative and significant for the OTHER category.  
 As indicated above, the puzzling finding for non-retirement, Federal transfer 
payments (OTHER) suggests that the SENATE2 variable may be incorporating population 
effects not associated with senate representation.  In fact, there is very little independent 
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variation in this variable over time.  A regression of SENATE2 on the state fixed effects 
produces an R
2
 of 0.995.  Thus, the “within estimates” of the coefficient for SENATE2 in 
TABLES 3A and 3B are based on less than 0.5% of the variation in this variable.  This raises 
concerns about what exactly the residual variation in SENATE2 is measuring.  Given that 
there is so little variation in SENATE2 over time, we next turn to “between” estimates as a 
further robustness check. 
 
5.  ROBUSTNESS CHECK #2: PANEL DATA “BETWEEN” ESTIMATION OF THE  
     ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION. 
 
The small state effect is fundamentally a cross-sectional hypothesis.  It says that small states 
will be disproportionately influential in the allocation of Federal funding, relative to larger 
states. Thus, the most natural test of this hypothesis is cross-sectional. Unfortunately, because 
identification of the SENATE and SENATE2 coefficients depends on variations in population, 
and population may enter Federal funding decisions via numerous channels, there is reason 
for concern that state-specific omitted variables may cause bias in the estimates.  This was the 
motivation for using fixed effects in the H&P study.  However, there needs to be substantial 
within-state variation to obtain reliable fixed-effects estimates.  As the previous section has 
shown, there is reason to question whether sufficient such variation exists in the H&P data 
set. 
 TABLE 4A reports the same specification used in TABLE 3A, except that estimation 
is now based on the OLS “between” procedure.  As discussed above, one problem with the 
fixed effects estimates is that there is very little variation in the SENATE2 variable that is not 
explained by the fixed effects.  This is not the case in the between framework.  When 
SENATE2 is regressed on the other explanatory variables in the between regression the 
resulting R
2
 is 0.6142.  The trade-off in adopting the between estimator is that while it affords 
greater independent variation in the variable of interest, it does not address the concern that 
population size across states may be associated with other state characteristics not controlled 
for in the specification. 
 With respect to the small state hypothesis, the estimates in TABLE 4A provide both 
good news and bad news.  The good news is that the coefficient on GRANTS is now positive 
and significant.  A relatively small state (25
th
 percentile) is estimated to receive 27% more 
Federal grant funding per capita than a relatively large state (75
th
 percentile).  Furthermore, 
the troubling negative and significant coefficient that was estimated for OTHER is now 
positive and insignificant.  The bad news is that the evidence of a small state effect for 
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PROCUREMENT has now vanished.  The estimated coefficient is now negative and 
marginally insignificantly different from zero (it is significant at the 12% level). Further, 
there is little change when the models are estimated without all the other political variables 
(see TABLE 4B).  The SENATE2 coefficient for PROCUREMENT remains negative and 
marginally insignificant (significant at the 11% level).  
 
6.  HYPOTHESIS TESTS. 
 
The preceding analysis has produced four sets of estimates of the effect of population-based 
senate representation across budget categories.  Arguments can be made for and against each 
set.  To formalize the testing of the small state effect, we re-estimate each set of equations 
using seemingly unrelated regression and test for differences in the SENATE2 coefficient 
across equations.  The results are reported in TABLE 5. 
 Predictions P1-P8 imply that all the cells in the table should be positive.  For example, 
P1 is SENATE, Wages SENATE, Retirement  .  Evidence in favour of this prediction is that the estimated 
coefficient for the SENATE2 coefficient in the lnWAGES regression should be larger than the 
estimated coefficient in the lnRETIREMENT equation.  In TABLE 3A, the respective 
estimates are 0.0019 and -0.0001.  The difference between these two estimates is 0.00201, 
which is consistent with the prediction.  This difference value is reported in the top left cell in 
the table.  The corresponding Z-value is reported directly below it.  The other cells in the 
table are calculated in like manner.  To test each of the predictions 
SENATE2, Column SENATE2, Row  , we form the null hypothesis 0 SENATE2, Column SENATE2, RowH :   .  
Rejection of the null hypothesis supports the existence of the small-state effect. 
 The results are mixed.  Of the 32 differences in SENATE2 coefficients, 24 are positive 
and 8 are negative.  In the 32 tests reported in TABLE 5, the null is rejected a total of 15 
times.  This provides some support for H&P’s predictions.  However, there are a substantial 
number of conflicting results.  Of the 8 negative values in the table, 7 are significant at the 
5% level. Perhaps most damaging for the small state hypothesis, 6 of the 7 negative and 
significant differences are associated with PROCUREMENT spending.   
 Putting together (i) the hypothesis tests from TABLE 5; (ii) the individual regression 
results from TABLES 3 and 4, including negative and significant SENATE2 coefficients for 
OTHER expenditures; and (iii) contradictory evidence for hypotheses having to do with 
PROCUREMENT spending, we conclude that the evidence for the small state effect is weak.  
In particular, the sensitivity of the results to different specifications and estimation 
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procedures, and the substantial minority of conflicting results, raise concerns that population 
affects Federal spending through multiple avenues.  It may not be possible to separate out the 
effect of Senate representation from these other effects. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION. 
 
This study replicates and analyzes research by Hoover and Pecorino (2005).  H&P compare 
the sensitivity of different types of Federal spending to a variable measuring US Senators per 
capita for each state. Based upon previous research and their own understanding of the US 
political system, they hypothesize that Federal spending at the state level on grants and pro-
curement will be most sensitive to this Senate representation variable; that spending on retire-
ment and disability and other non-retirement transfer programs will be least sensitive; and 
that spending on wages and salaries will be moderately sensitive. Their empirical findings 
generally support this prediction, and our replication of their estimation produces very similar 
results. 
 Our contribution to this literature is that we identify three shortcomings in H&P’s em-
pirical analysis. We show that identification of the variable for Senate representation depends 
crucially on a linear rather than log-linear specification of the variables.  When one expresses 
the key variables in logs, the data matrix is no longer full rank.  Further, we argue that the 
Senate representation variable is itself misspecified, because it suggests a decline in the small 
state effect when a state’s population increases, even if that increase is smaller than that of 
other states. Finally, we show that there is very little variation in the key Senate representa-
tion variable over time. These considerations lead us to reformulate the Senate representation 
variable and to calculate “between” panel estimates to compare with the fixed effect 
estimates.  
 Our analyses produce mixed results.  In our fixed effects analyses, we obtain evidence 
that procurement spending is the category most sensitive to the Senate representation varia-
ble, consistent with the theory, but that spending on grants is not sensitive to the variable.  
We also estimate a negative and statistically significant effect for the category of non-retire-
ment, transfer payments, which is inconsistent with the theory.  When we switch to between 
estimation, we find that the only statistically significant estimate occurs in the equation for 
Federal grants.  However, the respective coefficient in the procurement equation is of the 
wrong sign, and just misses statistical significance at the 10% level.  Finally, when we per-
form an extensive set of hypothesis tests, while a majority of the tests support the small state 
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effect, we find that a substantial minority are contradictory.  Of greatest concern is the poor 
performance of the hypothesis tests for PROCUREMENT spending in the between equations. 
 Like the proverbial glass half full, there are many ways to interpret our findings.  
Specific results are highly sensitive to model specification and estimation procedure.  While 
the majority of our hypothesis tests support the small state effect, there are a substantial 
number of contradictory results.  The existence of these contradictory results suggests that it 
may not be possible to adequately identify the small state effect from other channels by 
which population affects Federal spending across states. 
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TABLE 1. 
Replication of Hoover and Pecorino’s Table 4 Results. 
 
VARIABLE 
Dep. Variable = SPENDING Dep. Variable = RETIREMENT 
H&P Estimates Replication H&P Estimates Replication 
INCOMES 
-0.153***  
(-9.70) 
-0.148*** 
(-9.19) 
-0.012*** 
(-6.95) 
-0.013*** 
(-6.63) 
ELECTORAL 
-55.94*** 
(-5.51) 
-53.66*** 
(-5.28) 
-9.69*** 
(-8.11) 
-9.32*** 
(-7.83) 
ELDERLY 
7169.97** 
(2.09) 
7448.90** 
(2.19) 
7440.42*** 
(18.40) 
7458.01*** 
(18.71) 
SENATE 
962.20*** 
(6.03) 
1189.45*** 
(6.72) 
119.78*** 
(6.38) 
150.79*** 
(7.27) 
LANDAREA 
586.27 
(0.43) 
-543.69 
(-0.48) 
71.64 
(0.44) 
-94.66 
(-0.71) 
HOUSE 
-100.59 
(-0.97) 
-140.02 
(-1.34) 
-2.14 
(-0.18) 
-8.93 
(-0.73) 
GOVP 
41.72* 
(1.72) 
39.25 
(1.63) 
4.30 
(1.51) 
3.62 
(1.28) 
HOUSEP 
70.42 
(1.51) 
59.35 
(0.91) 
6.39 
(1.16) 
-2.60 
(-0.34) 
SENATEP 
14.60 
(0.77) 
16.34 
(1.00) 
-0.76 
(-0.34) 
-0.03 
(-0.01) 
HMAJOR 
29.96 
(0.74) 
8.82 
(0.13) 
-1.1 
(-0.23) 
-12.23 
(-1.51) 
SMAJOR 
-0.10 
(-0.01) 
1.60 
(0.11) 
0.73 
(0.31) 
3.30* 
(1.94) 
VOTE 
-236.69*** 
(-4.82) 
-234.45*** 
(-4.80) 
-11.4 
(-1.97) 
-10.33* 
(-1.81) 
MARGIN 
-2332.49*** 
(-4.46) 
-2300.26*** 
(-4.42) 
-37.59 
(-0.61) 
-27.84 
(-0.46) 
MARVOTE 
2290.86*** 
(4.49) 
2259.49*** 
(4.43) 
-27.75 
(-0.46) 
-41.01 
(-0.69) 
MAJLEADER 
107.18 
(1.27) 
108.95 
(1.30) 
4.32 
(0.44) 
4.95 
(0.50) 
MINLEADER 
43.81 
(0.46) 
55.87 
(0.59) 
12.7 
(1.14) 
18.13 
(1.63) 
Adjusted R
2 0.915                0.916 0.979 0.980 
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TABLE 1. 
Replication of Hoover and Pecorino’s Table 4 Results (Continued) 
 
VARIABLE 
Dep. Variable = OTHER Dep. Variable = WAGES 
H&P Estimates Replication H&P Estimates Replication 
INCOMES 
-0.023*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.022*** 
-3.36 
-0.005 
(-1.38) 
-0.005 
(-1.28) 
ELECTORAL 
-2.54 
(-0.63) 
-1.95 
(-0.47) 
-14.05*** 
(-5.56) 
-13.92*** 
(-5.46) 
ELDERLY 
5570.53*** 
(4.05) 
5788.22*** 
(4.21) 
-7326.8*** 
(-8.56) 
-7323.96*** 
(-8.57) 
SENATE 
81.77 
(1.28) 
101.72 
(1.42) 
173.16*** 
(4.35) 
230.69*** 
(5.19) 
LANDAREA 
804.76 
(1.47) 
548.88 
(1.19) 
-1244.3*** 
(-3.65) 
-1204.45*** 
(-4.21) 
HOUSE 
-57.03 
(1.37) 
-60.46 
(-1.43) 
11.78 
(0.46) 
-0.39 
(-0.01) 
GOVP 
9.13 
(0.94) 
7.03 
(0.72) 
-16.5*** 
(-2.73) 
-14.12** 
(-2.33) 
HOUSEP 
1.24 
(0.07) 
19.51 
(0.74) 
2.59 
(0.22) 
-14.51 
(-0.89) 
SENATEP 
4.82 
(0.63) 
2.87 
(0.43) 
-3.28 
(-0.69) 
-1.83 
(-0.45) 
HMAJOR 
53.71*** 
(3.33) 
49.19* 
(1.76) 
-43.59*** 
(-4.34) 
-37.54** 
(-2.17) 
SMAJOR 
6.72 
(0.83) 
4.76 
(0.81) 
-8.44 
(-1.69) 
-9.15** 
(-2.51) 
VOTE 
-65.21*** 
(3.32) 
-67.16*** 
(-3.40) 
-1.2 
(-0.10) 
1.72 
(0.14) 
MARGIN 
-774.72*** 
(-3.70) 
-804.248*** 
(-3.82) 
-396.79*** 
(-3.05) 
-350.81*** 
(-2.68) 
MARVOTE 
1090.59*** 
(5.33) 
1119.40*** 
(5.43) 
419.18*** 
(3.30) 
375.99*** 
(2.94) 
MAJLEADER 
50.65 
(1.50) 
42.42 
(1.25) 
-19.12 
(-0.91) 
-9.49 
(-0.45) 
MINLEADER 
11.48 
(0.30) 
5.51 
(0.14) 
-42.41* 
(-1.80) 
-35.40 
(-1.48) 
Adjusted R
2 0.888 0.888 0.976 0.977 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Replication of Hoover and Pecorino’s Table 4 Results. 
 
VARIABLE 
Dep. Variable = GRANTS Dep. Variable = PROCUREMENT 
H&P Estimates Replication H&P Estimates Replication 
INCOMES 
-0.012*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.060*** 
(-4.94) 
ELECTORAL 
-3.54 
(-1.41) 
-2.64 
(-1.05) 
-24.2*** 
(-3.21) 
-24.59*** 
(-3.24) 
ELDERLY 
2639.55*** 
(3.10) 
2953.03*** 
(3.50) 
4186.66 
(1.64) 
3673.75 
(1.45) 
SENATE 
108.39*** 
(2.74) 
130.41*** 
(2.97) 
247.55** 
(-2.09) 
256.35* 
(1.94) 
LANDAREA 
-968.22*** 
(-2.85) 
-792.68*** 
(-2.80) 
2369.05** 
(2.33) 
1841.10** 
(2.16) 
HOUSE 
37.7 
(1.47) 
21.92 
(0.85) 
-103.03 
(-1.34) 
-88.03 
(-1.13) 
GOVP 
0.87 
(0.14) 
-1.24 
(-0.21) 
38.99** 
(2.16) 
38.73** 
(2.15) 
HOUSEP 
44.77*** 
(3.86) 
31.76** 
(1.97) 
0.53 
(0.00) 
21.00 
(0.43) 
SENATEP 
15.06*** 
(3.20) 
16.06*** 
(3.96) 
-5.27 
(-0.37) 
-4.64 
(-0.38) 
HMAJOR 
24.68** 
(2.47) 
-7.65 
(-0.45) 
-9.00 
(-0.30) 
26.18 
(0.51) 
SMAJOR 
5.7 
(1.14) 
14.25*** 
(3.95) 
1.65 
(0.11) 
-0.84 
(-0.08) 
VOTE 
-16.68 
(-1.37) 
-14.95 
(-1.24) 
-108.36*** 
(-2.97) 
-111.43*** 
(-3.06) 
MARGIN 
113.43 
(0.88) 
126.38 
(0.98) 
-688.1* 
(-1.77) 
-721.81* 
(-1.86) 
MARVOTE 
20.93 
(0.17) 
-8.34 
(-0.07) 
568.74 
(1.50) 
622.10 
(1.63) 
MAJLEADER 
4.44 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
78.63 
(1.26) 
79.58 
(1.27) 
MINLEADER 
23.37 
(1.00) 
35.21 
(1.50) 
27.11 
(0.39) 
25.96 
(0.37) 
Adjusted R
2 0.942 0.943 0.868 0.868 
 
NOTE: The t-statistics  are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time 
fixed effects.  
 
*,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 2. 
Sensitivity of Federal Spending Categories to Senate Representation: Original and Replicated Results. 
 
 RETIREMENT OTHER WAGES GRANTS PROCUREMENT 
H&P’S RESULTS:      
(1) Estimated SENATE Coefficient 119.78 81.77 173.16 108.39 247.55 
(2) Mean of Dependent Variable 1816.84 1193.41 565.01 992.29 644.65 
(1) ÷ (2) 6.6% 6.9% 30.6% 10.9% 38.4% 
      
REPLICATION RESULTS:      
(1) Estimated SENATE Coefficient 150.79 101.72 230.69 130.41 256.35 
(2) Mean of Dependent Variable 1729.36 978.22 749.74 870.08 810.06 
(1) ÷ (2) 8.7% 10.4% 30.8% 15.0% 31.6% 
 
 
NOTE: TABLE 2 compares estimated sensitivity of Federal spending categories to state population size as reported in Hoover and Pecorino 
(2005, upper panel) to those obtained in the present replication (lower panel).  The estimated coefficient in the first row of each panel indicates 
the estimated effect of a unit change in the SENATE variable on the amount of per-capita Federal spending in each category.  The third row of 
each panel indicates the size of the effect of that unit change in SENATE as a percent of total spending.   
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TABLE 3A. 
Robustness Check #1: FE OLS Estimation with Alternative Specification. 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 lnRETIREMENT lnOTHER lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
lnINCOMES 
-0.1259*** 
(-4.97) 
-0.5693*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.1462 
(-1.64) 
0.0119 
(0.13) 
0.2275 
(0.80) 
ELECTORAL 
0.0003 
(0.36) 
0.0039 
(0.91) 
-0.0077*** 
(-2.67) 
0.0111*** 
(3.90) 
0.0240*** 
(2.63) 
ELDERLY 
4.8804*** 
(20.79) 
10.0254*** 
(8.04) 
-2.6806*** 
(-3.24) 
0.6803 
(0.83) 
8.9193*** 
(3.39) 
SENATE2 
-0.0001 
(-1.05) 
-0.0023*** 
(-3.20) 
0.0019*** 
(3.81) 
-0.0002 
(-0.33) 
0.0029* 
(1.87) 
lnLANDAREA 
0.3261*** 
(10.65) 
0.0580 
(0.36) 
0.4066*** 
(3.77) 
0.2954*** 
(2.77) 
1.0860*** 
(3.16) 
HOUSE 
-0.0181*** 
(-2.61) 
0.0702* 
(1.90) 
-0.0767*** 
(-3.14) 
0.0472* 
(1.95) 
-0.3066*** 
(-3.94) 
GOVP 
0.0078*** 
(4.72) 
0.0140 
(1.59) 
0.0142** 
(2.44) 
-0.0043 
(-0.74) 
0.0598*** 
(3.22) 
HOUSEP 
-0.0027 
(-0.63) 
0.0075 
(0.33) 
-0.0150 
(-0.99) 
0.0434*** 
(2.91) 
0.0678 
(1.41) 
SENATEP 
-0.0036*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.0049 
(-0.84) 
-0.0052 
(-1.32) 
0.0169*** 
(4.40) 
0.0100 
(0.80) 
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 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 lnRETIREMENT lnOTHER lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
0.0502** 
(2.05) 
-0.0460*** 
(-2.83) 
  
0.0089 
(0.55) 
0.0811 
(1.57) 
SMAJOR 
0.0004 
(0.45) 
-0.0017 
(-0.32) 
-0.0030 
(-0.85) 
0.0153*** 
(4.44) 
0.0071 
(0.64) 
VOTE 
-0.0019 
(-0.58) 
-0.0681*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.0051 
(-0.44) 
-0.0298*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.1211*** 
(-3.27) 
MARGIN 
-0.0111 
(-0.31) 
-0.7271*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.0921 
(-0.74) 
-0.2972** 
(-2.41) 
-1.0524*** 
(-2.65) 
MARVOTE 
-0.0642* 
(-1.86) 
0.9675*** 
(5.29) 
0.2612** 
(2.15) 
0.2863** 
(2.39) 
0.7580** 
(1.96) 
MAJLEADER 
0.0104* 
(1.82) 
0.0327 
(1.08) 
-0.0042 
(-0.21) 
-0.0202 
(-1.02) 
0.0594 
(0.93) 
MINLEADER 
0.0252*** 
(3.97) 
-0.0119 
(-0.35) 
-0.0220 
(-0.99) 
-0.0345 
(-1.56) 
0.0172 
(0.24) 
Adjusted R
2 0.9826 0.9179 0.9788 0.9472 0.8917 
 
NOTE: The t-statistics  are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time fixed effects.  
 
*,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3B. 
Robustness Check #1: FE OLS Estimation with Alternative Specification Omitting All Political Variables. 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 lnRETIREMENT lnOTHER lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
lnINCOMES 
-0.1493*** 
(-5.57) 
-0.4968*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.0657 
(-0.74) 
0.0564 
(0.64) 
0.1179 
(0.43) 
ELDERLY 
4.7366*** 
(18.84) 
9.8461*** 
(8.02) 
-2.1771*** 
(-2.61) 
0.9404 
(1.14) 
9.0596*** 
(3.49) 
SENATE2 
0.0001 
(0.90) 
-0.0020*** 
(-3.04) 
0.0005 
(1.09) 
0.0008* 
(1.77) 
0.0045*** 
(3.26) 
lnLANDAREA 
0.2010*** 
(7.65) 
0.0282 
(0.22) 
0.6971*** 
(8.00) 
0.1625* 
(1.89) 
0.1299 
(0.48) 
Adjusted R
2 0.9784 0.9135 0.9766 0.9419 0.8854 
 
NOTE: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
 
*,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4A. 
Robustness Check #2: Panel Data “Between” Estimation with Alternative Specification. 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 lnRETIREMENT lnOTHER lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
lnINCOMES 
-0.1927 
(-1.60) 
0.2819 
(1.16) 
0.3685 
(0.59) 
-0.0653 
(-0.26) 
0.7848 
(0.91) 
ELECTORAL 
-0.0036** 
(-2.27) 
0.0046 
(1.44) 
-0.0073 
(-0.89) 
0.0051 
(1.55) 
-0.0146 
(-1.28) 
ELDERLY 
4.1384*** 
(6.20) 
10.2845*** 
(7.62) 
-10.1504*** 
(-2.92) 
-1.7798 
(-1.28) 
-12.9765** 
(-2.70) 
SENATE2 
-0.0001 
(-0.98) 
0.0004 
(1.47) 
0.0009 
(1.28) 
0.0018*** 
(6.55) 
-0.0016 
(-1.61) 
lnLANDAREA 
-0.0218 
(-1.50) 
0.0550* 
(1.87) 
-0.0331 
(-0.44) 
-0.0186 
(-0.61) 
-0.0640 
(-0.61) 
HOUSE 
0.1054 
(1.02) 
-0.2237 
(-1.07) 
-0.8691 
(-1.62) 
0.0657 
(0.31) 
-0.8745 
(-1.18) 
GOVP 
0.0107 
(0.21) 
-0.2325** 
(-2.21) 
0.0684 
(0.25) 
-0.2115* 
(-1.95) 
-0.5041 
(-1.34) 
HOUSEP 
-0.0031 
(-0.02) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
1.7531* 
(1.80) 
1.0154** 
(2.61) 
1.0354 
(0.77) 
SENATEP 
0.0107 
(0.18) 
-0.1352 
(-1.13) 
-0.2606 
(-0.85) 
-0.1139 
(-0.93) 
0.2286 
(0.54) 
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 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 lnRETIREMENT lnOTHER lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
HMAJOR 
0.0466 
(0.33) 
0.2438 
(0.84) 
1.1266 
(1.51) 
0.5407* 
(1.82) 
0.1566 
(0.15) 
SMAJOR 
-0.0224 
(-0.30) 
-0.1224 
(-0.82) 
0.1030 
(0.27) 
-0.0483 
(-0.32) 
0.0331 
(0.06) 
VOTE 
-0.1476 
(-1.32) 
0.4818** 
(2.13) 
-0.3439 
(-0.59) 
0.2783 
(1.20) 
0.3931 
(0.49) 
MARGIN 
-2.8395** 
(-2.39) 
6.4691** 
(2.69) 
1.4991 
(0.24) 
2.4844 
(1.01) 
-0.5180 
(-0.06) 
MARVOTE 
3.4736** 
(2.33) 
-9.3482*** 
(-3.11) 
-2.1731 
(-0.28) 
-4.9513 
(-1.60) 
2.3277 
(0.22) 
MAJLEADER 
0.0471 
(0.26) 
-0.0597 
(-0.16) 
-0.4952 
(-0.53) 
-0.1290 
(-0.34) 
1.0810 
(0.83) 
MINLEADER 
0.0200 
(0.13) 
0.1557 
(0.51) 
0.3700 
(0.47) 
0.0350 
(0.11) 
0.0755 
(0.07) 
R
2 0.7744 0.7506 0.4927 0.7256 0.4364 
 
NOTE: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
 
*,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4B. 
Robustness Check #2: Panel Data Between Estimation with Alternative Specification 
Omitting All Political Variables. 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 lnRETIREMENT lnOTHER lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
lnINCOMES 
-0.2168 
(-2.33) 
0.1922 
(0.89) 
0.2626 
(0.54) 
0.0840 
(0.35) 
0.9619 
(1.49) 
ELDERLY 
4.4579 
(7.30) 
10.1101*** 
(7.10) 
-10.0037*** 
(-3.14) 
-1.7511 
(-1.11) 
-12.8263*** 
(-3.03) 
SENATE2 
-0.0000 
(-0.02) 
-0.0000 
(-0.04) 
0.0006 
(1.05) 
0.0012*** 
(4.52) 
-0.0012 
(-1.67) 
lnLANDAREA 
-0.0199 
(-1.67) 
0.0409 
(1.47) 
0.0220 
(0.35) 
-0.0107 
(-0.35) 
0.0033 
(0.04) 
R
2 0.6965 0.5528 0.3129 0.4271 0.2924 
 
NOTE: The t-statistics  are presented in parentheses. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
 
*,**,*** Denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5. 
Tests of Predictions:  SENATE2, Column SENATE2, Row   
 
 lnWAGES lnGRANTS lnPROCUREMENT 
Table 3a (Fixed Effects, Full Model): 
lnRETIREMENT 
0.00201*** 
(4.97) 
-0.00002 
(0.00) 
0.00305** 
(1.85) 
lnOTHER 
0.00420*** 
(4.23) 
0.00218** 
(1.82) 
0.00524*** 
(3.02) 
lnWAGES ---- 
-0.00202 
(2.45) 
0.00104 
(0.62) 
Table 3b (Fixed Effects, Restricted Model):  
lnRETIREMENT 
0.00036 
(1.10) 
0.00065 
(0.73) 
0.00436*** 
(2.92) 
lnOTHER 
0.00245*** 
(2.67) 
0.00274*** 
(2.22) 
0.00645*** 
(4.07)) 
lnWAGES ---- 
0.00029 
(0.35) 
0.00400*** 
(2.70) 
Table 4a (Between, Full Model): 
lnRETIREMENT 
0.00103*** 
(2.63) 
0.001972*** 
(8.44) 
-0.00143 
(-2.79) 
lnOTHER 
0.00050 
(1.04) 
0.00144*** 
(4.41) 
-0.00196 
(-3.79) 
lnWAGES ---- 
0.000939** 
(1.73) 
-0.00246 
(-5.09) 
Table 4b (Between, Restricted Model): 
LnRETIREMENT 
0.00057 
(1.02) 
0.001223*** 
(3.81) 
-0.00121 
(-2.28) 
LnOTHER 
0.00058 
(1.07) 
0.001231*** 
(4.00) 
-0.00120 
(-2.36) 
LnWAGES ---- 
0.000648 
(1.15) 
-0.00178 
(-3.74) 
 
NOTE #1:  Predictions P1-P8 in the text imply that all the cells in the table should be 
positive.  The appropriate null hypothesis for the prediction SENATE2, Column SENATE2, Row   is 
0 SENATE2, Column SENATE2, RowH :   . Rejection of the null supports the existence of the small-state 
effect. 
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NOTE #2:  The numbers in the table equal the differences in the SENATE2 coefficient from a 
given Column regression minus the SENATE2 coefficient from the corresponding Row 
regression.  For example, in TABLE 3A, the difference in the SENATE2 coefficient in the 
lnWAGES regression minus the SENATE2 coefficient in the lnRETIREMENT regression is 
0.00201 (= 0.0019 - -0.0001). The numbers in parentheses are Z statistics.  
*,**,*** Denote rejection of the null hypothesis, 0 SENATE2, Column SENATE2, RowH :    at the 10, 5, and 
1% levels, respectively.    
25 
APPENDIX 
Sample Characteristics. 
 
 MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
ELDERLY 0.123 0.125 0.021 0.029 0.186 
ELECTORAL 10.7 8 9.3 3 54 
GOVP 0.399 0 0.490 0 1 
GRANTS 870.08 800.67 296.27 401.04 3005.64 
HMAJOR 0.57 0.57 0.28 0 1 
HOUSE 1.76 1.75 0.21 1.08 2.50 
HOUSEP 0.45 0.44 0.28 0 1 
INCOME 23243 22710 3877 14099 38689 
LANDAREA 0.0485 0.0125 0.1469 0.0009 1.2721 
MAJLEADER 0.02 0 0.14 0 1 
MINLEADER 0.02 0 0.14 0 1 
MARGIN 0.140 0.120 0.104 0.000 0.522 
MARVOTE 0.124 0.105 0.115 0.000 0.522 
OTHER 978.22 942.47 344.76 244.09 2541.78 
POPULATION 5078097 3408646 5500174 453690 33500000 
PROCUREMENT 810.06 652.76 587.80 154.72 3812.50 
RETIREMENT 1729.36 1735.33 238.42 777.75 2545.14 
SENATE 1.04 0.59 1.04 0.06 4.45 
SENATE2 130.1 71.6 130.5 8.3 566.2 
SENATEP 1.00 1 7602331.00 0 2 
SMAJOR 1.07 1 0.76 0 2 
SPENDING 5231.76 5114.50 984.42 3502 8825 
WAGES 749.74 635.45 469.31 261.01 3126.67 
USPOPULATION 2.54E+08 2.52E+08 1.43E+07 2.33E+08 2.78E+08 
VOTE 0.78 1 0.41 0 1 
 
